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We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game,where besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat,win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. Whilepairwise imitation fails to sustain unconditional cooperation and extortionregardless of game parametrization, myopic updating gives rise to thecoexistence of all five strategies if the temptation to defect is sufficientlylarge or if the degree distribution of the interaction network isheterogeneous. This counterintuitive evolutionary outcome emerges as a resultof an unexpected chain of strategy invasions. Firstly, defectors emerge andcoarsen spontaneously among players adopting win-stay-lose-shift. Secondly,extortioners and players adopting tit-for-tat emerge and spread via neutraldrift among the emerged defectors. And lastly, among the extortioners,cooperators become viable too. These recurrent evolutionary invasions yield afive-strategy phase that is stable irrespective of the system size and thestructure of the interaction network, and they reveal the most unexpectedmechanism that stabilizes extortion and cooperation in an evolutionary setting.

Defection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populations