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In spatial games players typically alter their strategy by imitating the mostsuccessful or one randomly selected neighbor. Since a single neighbor is takenas reference, the information stemming from other neighbors is neglected, whichbegets the consideration of alternative, possibly more realistic approaches.Here we show that strategy changes inspired not only by the performance ofindividual neighbors but rather by entire neighborhoods introduce aqualitatively different evolutionary dynamics that is able to support thestable existence of very small cooperative clusters. This leads to phasediagrams that differ significantly from those obtained by means of pairwisestrategy updating. In particular, the survivability of cooperators is possibleeven by high temptations to defect and over a much wider uncertainty range. Wesupport the simulation results by means of pair approximations and analysis ofspatial patterns, which jointly highlight the importance of local informationfor the resolution of social dilemmas.

Beyond pairwise strategy updating in the prisoner's dilemma game