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The study of the nature of human cooperation still contains gaps needinginvestigation. Previous findings reveal that socialization effectively promotescooperation in the well-known Prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. However,theoretical concepts fail to describe high levels of cooperation (probabilityhigher than 50%) that were observed empirically. In this paper, we derive asymmetrical quantal response equilibrium (QRE) in PD in Markov strategies andtest it against experimental data. Our results indicate that for low levels ofrationality, QRE manages to describe high cooperation. In contrast, for highrationality QRE converges to the Nash equilibrium and describes low-cooperationbehavior of participants. In the area of middle rationality, QRE matches thecurve that represents the set of Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies.Further, we find that QRE serves as a dividing line between behavior before andafter socialization, according to the experimental data. Finally, wesuccessfully highlight the theoretically-predicted intersection of the set ofNash equilibrium in Markov strategies and the QRE curve.

Mutual cooperation and tolerance to defection in the context of socialization: the theoretical model and experimental evidence