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Efficient water allocation in a transboundary river basin is a complex issue in water resources management. This work develops a framework for the allocation of transboundary river water between the countries located in the river basin to evaluate the characteristics of allocation approaches. The allocation of river water is obtained based on initial-water conditions, cooperative, and non-cooperative game-theoretic approaches. The initial-conditions water allocation approach assigns 34, 40, and 26% of the Harirud River flow to Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkmenistan, respectively. The game-theoretic cooperative approach assigns 36, 42, and 22% of the river flow to Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkmenistan, respectively. The non-cooperative game-theoretic approach establishes that the most stable water allocation was 42, 38, and 20% of the Harirud River flow for Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkmenistan, respectively. Human and agricultural water-stress criteria are used to evaluate the water allocations in the Harirud River basin. The criterion of human water stress has the largest influence in Iran, and the criterion of agricultural water stress has the smallest influence in Afghanistan. This work’s results indicate the initial-conditions water allocation approach favors Turkmenistan, whereas the cooperative and the non-cooperative game-theoretic approaches favors Iran and Afghanistan, respectively. The results show that the priorities of each country governs water allocation, and cooperation is shown to be necessary to achieve sustainable development.

Evaluation of cooperative and non-cooperative game theoretic approaches for water allocation of transboundary rivers