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Du Role de I'Individu dans le Deter minisme Social. D. DRAGHISCESCO. Paris, Felix Alcan, 1904. Pp. 367. Le Problbme du Determinisme Social, Determinisme biologiquc et Determinisme social. D. DRAGHISCESCO. Paris, Editions de la Grande France, 1903. Pp. 99. M. Draghiscesco, in a brochure entitled Le Problbme du Determinisme Social and in a book following it a year later, Du Role de VLndividu dans le Determinisme Social, has presented a statement of the relation of sociology and psychology that in any case throws into strong relief the problems involved in the relations of these sciences. In his earlier work M. Draghiscesco is occupied with the difference which he conceives to exist between the social sciences and the positivistic natural sciences. These latter, according to him, serve to prophesy the future through a study of the past. The past yields them the facts which in their uniformity and invariability reveal the laws that determine the necessary succession of events in the future. To this group of sciences biology must belong, and if the individual is to be defined and analyzed by a physiology and a psychology dependent upon physiology, and a sociology that follows the same lead, the determinism of the social sciences will be that of biology. Against this the author makes a vigorous protest. The basis of this protest is that the events of consciousness can not be predicated, because they spring from a source which lies higher than that of natural phenomena. In the first place he finds that the phenomena of consciousness are of a totally different character. They are to a large degree rational and teleological in their structure, while the natural phenomena are mechanical. From this he goes on to discuss the nature of the relation of the body and consciousness. The hypothesis that consciousness is an epiphenomenon is rejected because of the evident efficacy of consciousness in our conduct, while the parallel doctrines of materialism and spiritualism are impaled upon their metaphysical contradictions and implications.

Du Rôle de l'Individu dans le Déterminisme Social; Le Problème du Déterminisme Social, Déterminisme biologique et Déterminisme social.