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When the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by the UN Security Council in 1993 to try individuals accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide (or, as I shall refer to these international crimes herein, atrocity crimes), it marked in many ways a turning point in international law and relations. The creation of the ICTY reflected an effort not simply to address cries to bring an end to the horrible violence then ongoing in the Balkans but also to answer a groundswell of demands to end impunity for violations of international law more generally. In the years that followed, the ICTY demonstrated in concrete terms that accountability for international crimes was possible, in full compliance with norms of fairness and due process, and it showed practically how this could be done. During the quarter-century since the ICTY’s creation, a number of other international or internationalized courts were established, including the ICTY’s sister court, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), as well as the International Criminal Court (ICC), each one proof of an emerging consensus at the international level that—with sufficient political will and resources—principled accountability for violations of international law could be achieved. During this same period, and after a half-century of virtual inaction, an increasing number of authorities in national jurisdictions have undertaken domestic criminal trials of individuals alleged to have committed atrocity crimes. We see this in the Balkans (thanks in part to the completion strategy of the ICTY, which called for that Tribunal to support national judicial systems1) as well as in a great many other jurisdictions, from Guatemala to Canada and from Sweden and Germany to Rwanda. Taking stock of all the developments in the twenty-five years since the establishment of the ICTY, there is much that one can be heartened by. Indeed, I have referred to these developments as the dawning of a new era of accountability, an era in which accountability is

Closing the Accountability Gap: Concrete Steps Toward Ending Impunity for Atrocity Crimes