English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Zendy Plus

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Zendy Tools

Zendy Open

Evolutionary game dynamics is one of the most fruitful frameworks forstudying evolution in different disciplines, from Biology to Economics. Withinthis context, the approach of choice for many researchers is the so-calledreplicator equation, that describes mathematically the idea that thoseindividuals performing better have more offspring and thus their frequency inthe population grows. While very many interesting results have been obtainedwith this equation in the three decades elapsed since it was first proposed, itis important to realize the limits of its applicability. One particularlyrelevant issue in this respect is that of non-mean-field effects, that mayarise from temporal fluctuations or from spatial correlations, both neglectedin the replicator equation. This review discusses these temporal and spatialeffects focusing on the non-trivial modifications they induce when compared tothe outcome of replicator dynamics. Alongside this question, the hypothesis oflinearity and its relation to the choice of the rule for strategy update isalso analyzed. The discussion is presented in terms of the emergence ofcooperation, as one of the current key problems in Biology and in otherdisciplines.

Evolutionary game theory: Temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics