English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Zendy Open

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Insights

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Zendy Tools

Zendy Plus

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

The median-voter hypothesis (MVH) predicts convergence of two party platformsacross a one-dimensional political spectrum during majoritarian elections. Fromthe viewpoint of the MVH, an explanation of polarization is that each electionhas a different median voter so that a party cannot please all the medianvoters at the same time. We consider two parties competing to win voters alonga one-dimensional spectrum and assume that each party nominates one candidateout of two in the primary election, for which the electorates represent onlyone side of the whole population. We argue that all the four candidates willcome to the same distance from the median of the total population throughbest-response dynamics.

Symmetric Nash equilibrium of political polarization in a two-party system