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In this work, we proposed a new $N$-person game in which the players can beton two options, for example represented by two boxers. Some of the players haveprivileged information about the boxers and part of them can provide thisinformation to uninformed players. However, this information may be true if theinformed player is altruist or false if he is selfish. So, in this game, theplayers are divided in three categories: informed and altruist players,informed and selfish players, and uninformed players. By considering thematchings ($N/2$ distinct pairs of randomly chosen players) and that the payoffof the winning group follows aspects captured from two important games, thepublic goods game and minority game, we showed quantitatively and qualitativelyhow the altruism can impact on the privileged information. We localizedanalytically the regions of positive payoffs which were corroborated bynumerical simulations performed for all values of information and altruismdensities given that we know the information level of the informed players.Finally, in an evolutionary version of the game ,we showed that the gain of theinformed players can get worse if we adopted the following procedure: theplayers increase their investment for situations of positive payoffs, anddecrease their investment when negative payoffs occur.

When and how much the altruism impacts your privileged information? Proposing a new paradigm in game theory: The boxers game