English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Zendy Plus

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Zendy Tools

Zendy Open

We propose an analytically tractable variation of the minority game in whichrational agents use probabilistic strategies. In our model, $N$ agents choosebetween two alternatives repeatedly, and those who are in the minority get apay-off 1, others zero. The agents optimize the expectation value of theirdiscounted future pay-off, the discount parameter being $\lambda$. We proposean alternative to the standard Nash equilibrium, called co-action equilibrium,which gives higher expected pay-off for all agents. The optimal choice ofprobabilities of different actions are determined exactly in terms of simpleself -consistent equations. The optimal strategy is characterized by $N$ realparameters, which are non-analytic functions of $\lambda$, even for a finitenumber of agents. The solution for $N \leq 7$ is worked out explicitlyindicating the structure of the solution for larger $N$. For large enoughfuture time horizon, the optimal strategy switches from random choice to awin-stay lose-shift strategy, with the shift probability depending on thecurrent state and $\lambda$.

Strategy switches and co-action equilibria in a minority game