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We consider the interim core of normal form cooperative games and exchangeeconomies with incomplete information based on the partition model. We developa solution concept that we can situate roughly between Wilson's coarse core andYannelis's private core. We investigate the interim negotiation of contractsand address the two situations of contract delivery: interim and ex post. Oursolution differs from Wilson's concept because the measurability of strategiesin our solution is postponed until the consumption date (assumed with respectto the information that will be known by the players at the consumption date).For interim consumption, our concept differs from Yannelis's private corebecause players can negotiate conditional on proper common knowledge events inour solution, which strengthens the interim aspect of the game, as we willillustrate with examples.

An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information: a correction