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This paper proposes the first user-independent inter-keystroke timing attackson PINs. Our attack method is based on an inter-keystroke timing dictionarybuilt from a human cognitive model whose parameters can be determined by asmall amount of training data on any users (not necessarily the targetvictims). Our attacks can thus be potentially launched on a large scale inreal-world settings. We investigate inter-keystroke timing attacks in differentonline attack settings and evaluate their performance on PINs at differentstrength levels. Our experimental results show that the proposed attackperforms significantly better than random guessing attacks. We furtherdemonstrate that our attacks pose a serious threat to real-world applicationsand propose various ways to mitigate the threat.

When Human cognitive modeling meets PINs: User-independent inter-keystroke timing attacks