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Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been proposed as a way to identifyand authenticate electronic devices. Recently, several ideas have beenpresented that aim to achieve the same for quantum devices. Some of theseconstructions apply single-qubit gates in order to provide a secure fingerprintof the quantum device. In this work, we formalize the class of ClassicalReadout Quantum PUFs (CR-QPUFs) using the statistical query (SQ) model andexplicitly show insufficient security for CR-QPUFs based on single qubitrotation gates, when the adversary has SQ access to the CR-QPUF. We demonstratehow a malicious party can learn the CR-QPUF characteristics and forge thesignature of a quantum device through a modelling attack using a simpleregression of low-degree polynomials. The proposed modelling attack wassuccessfully implemented in a real-world scenario on real IBM Q quantummachines. We thoroughly discuss the prospects and problems of CR-QPUFs wherequantum device imperfections are used as a secure fingerprint.

Learning Classical Readout Quantum PUFs based on single-qubit gates