English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

We consider a game in which the action set of each player is uncountable, andshow that, from weak assumptions on the common prior, any mixed strategy has anapproximately equivalent pure strategy. The assumption of this result can befurther weakened if we consider the purification of a Nash equilibrium.Combined with the existence theorem for a Nash equilibrium, we derive anexistence theorem for a pure strategy approximated Nash equilibrium undersufficiently weak assumptions. All of the pure strategies we derive in thispaper can take a finite number of possible actions.

On the Approximate Purification of Mixed Strategies in Games with Infinite Action Sets