Data Portability on the Internet
Author(s) -
Michael Wohlfarth
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
business and information systems engineering
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.022
H-Index - 44
eISSN - 2363-7005
pISSN - 1867-0202
DOI - 10.1007/s12599-019-00580-9
Subject(s) - software portability , enforcement , incentive , competition (biology) , variety (cybernetics) , business , european union , service (business) , the internet , industrial organization , computer science , world wide web , marketing , economics , microeconomics , international trade , ecology , programming language , artificial intelligence , political science , law , biology
Data portability allows users to transfer data between competing online services. As data gets increasingly valuable for online services and users alike, the enforcement of data portability within the European Union by the General Data Protection Regulation will have important ramifications for the competition in online markets. Thus, this paper develops a game-theoretic model to examine firms’ strategic reaction to data portability and to identify the ensuing market outcomes. It can be shown, among others, that although data portability is designed to protect users, they may be hurt because market entrants have an incentive to increase the amount of collected data compared to a regime without data portability. However, profits for new services and total surplus increase if the costs for implementation are not too large. This likely improves innovation and service variety. Consequently, the results provide important insights and case-specific recommendations for managers and policy makers in data-driven online markets.
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