Open AccessDelegation and motivation
Author(s) -
Lukas Angst,
Karol Jan Borowiecki
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
theory and decision
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.602
H-Index - 37
eISSN - 1573-7187
pISSN - 0040-5833
DOI - 10.1007/s11238-013-9370-7
Subject(s) - delegation , principal (computer security) , principal–agent problem , knowledge management , psychology , perception , social psychology , microeconomics , management science , computer science , business , economics , computer security , management , finance , corporate governance , neuroscience
We investigate the determinants of decision rights transfer and its effects on the motivation of an agent. The study is based on a laboratory experiment conducted on 130 subjects playing an innovative principal–agent game. Interestingly, the results show that agents do not favour a delegation and a decision is considered rather burdensome. Although the experiment could not give support for the behavioural hypothesis of higher effort provided by participants who receive choice subsequently, the survey illuminates the interaction between delegation motives, effort motivators, goals and other perceptions of the agents.
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