Open AccessIn what sense is understanding an intellectual virtue?
Author(s) -
Xingming Hu
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
synthese
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.851
H-Index - 65
eISSN - 1573-0964
pISSN - 0039-7857
DOI - 10.1007/s11229-019-02437-w
Subject(s) - virtue , metaphysics , philosophy of language , character (mathematics) , character traits , philosophy of science , epistemology , epistemic virtue , trait , philosophy of mind , philosophy , power (physics) , psychology , computer science , social psychology , physics , geometry , mathematics , quantum mechanics , programming language
In this paper, I distinguish between two senses of “understanding”: understanding as an epistemic good and understanding as a character trait or a distinctive power of the mind. I argue that understanding as a character trait or a distinctive power of the mind is an intellectual virtue while understanding as an epistemic good is not. Finally, I show how the distinction can help us better appreciate Aristotle’s account of intellectual virtue.
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