Keeping things in perspective
Author(s) -
Catherine Z. Elgin
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
philosophical studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.252
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1573-0883
pISSN - 0031-8116
DOI - 10.1007/s11098-010-9547-7
Subject(s) - epistemology , perspective (graphical) , scientific realism , representation (politics) , metaphysics , argument (complex analysis) , philosophy , philosophy of language , philosophy of mind , philosophy of science , realism , generalization , scientific theory , point (geometry) , computer science , mathematics , chemistry , artificial intelligence , biochemistry , geometry , politics , political science , law
Scientific realism holds that scientific representations are utterly objective. They describe the way the world is, independent of any point of view. In Scientific Representation, van Fraassen argues otherwise. If science is to afford an understanding of nature, it must be grounded in evidence. Since evidence is perspectival, science cannot vindicate its claims using only utterly objective representations. For science to do its epistemic job, it must involve perspectival representations. I explicate this argument and show its power.
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