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In this paper, I use Adam Smith’s account of the impartial spectator in the The Theory of Moral Sentiments in order to offer an adequate modest ideal observer theory of moral judgment that specifies the hypothetical conditions that guarantee the reliability of an agent’s (or agents’) responses in constituting the standard of moral judgment. However, the hypothetical conditions are themselves constructed from within a given society. I defend the account against three challenges: (a) ideal observer theories do not offer the right kind of motivation to act on the verdicts of the ideal observer (the motivational challenge); (b) ideal observer theories cannot explain why the idealization in question is well-motivated and not objectionably ad-hoc (the ad-hocness challenge); (c) further reflection might lead to the attainment of an even better standard than the one offered by a modestly idealized observer (the standards-for-standards challenge).

A Defense of Modest Ideal Observer Theory: The Case of Adam Smith’s Impartial Spectator