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International audienceArticle  30  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  1907/2006  concerns  the  sharing  ofdata between users of a chemical substance. We study this bargaining problem bymeans of a special class of games in coalitional form called data games (Dehez andTellone in J Public Econ Theory 15:654–673,2013). For such problems, compen-sation schemes specify how the data owners should be compensated by the agents inneeds of data. On the class of data games, the Core, the Nucleolus and the Shapleyvalue  provide  relevant  compensation  schemes.  We  provide  four  comparable  axi-omatic characterizations of the set of all (additive) compensation schemes belongingto the Core, of the Nucleolus, of the Shapley value and of the Full compensationmechanism,  a  compensation  scheme  exclusively  designed  for  data  sharing  prob-lems. The axioms reflects principles of various theories of justic

On compensation schemes for data sharing within the European REACH legislation