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The perceptual Self-Prioritization effect (SPE) refers to an advantage in attending to stimuli associated with the self relative to those associated with another individual. In the perceptual matching task, arbitrary pairings between oneself and other persons, and a geometric shape need to be learned. Apart from the SPE, this task also produces high matching performance for a close other. While cognitive representations of past selves are sometimes viewed as resembling that of an intimate other, and while there is some evidence that other types of psychological closeness modulate the SPE, it remains unclear whether such prioritization effects extend to past selves. Previous experiments on this topic required participants to distinguish between different points in time within the same task, raising the possibility that potential past self-prioritization was masked by task difficulty. In our experiment, we addressed this potential confound by presenting N = 118 participants with a simpler version of the matching task. We re-investigated self-prioritization in perceptual matching under conditions of mental time travel to the past. In line with previous evidence, we found clear prioritization of present selves, which was evident in response times, accuracies and the efficiency of practice. Performance was consistently poorest for the past self, indicating not only a lack of privileged processing, but rather a relative de-prioritization. Performance was not improved by either increased proximity of the time period in question, nor by experimenter-induced re-imagining of the self. Our results do not support a perceptual prioritization of past selves.

Time is of the essence: past selves are not prioritized even when selective discrimination costs are controlled for