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textabstractThis paper applies a game theoretic model to situations in which the Dutch government expropriates land from some farmers in order to create a new public project. The model is a version of a finite period bargaining model with asymmetric information and one-sided offers. It is shown that the model can explain some casual observations as the fact that usually, but not always, the government and the farmers settle by agreement

The price of land and the process of expropriation