English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

In this work we present an efficient compiler that converts any circuit C into one that is resilient to tampering with 1/poly(k) fraction of the wires, where k is a security parameter independent of the size of the original circuit |C|. Our tampering model is similar to the one proposed by Ishai et al. (Eurocrypt, 2006) where a tampering adversary may tamper with any wire in the circuit (as long as the overall number of tampered wires is bounded), by setting it to 0 or 1, or by toggling with it. Our result improves upon that of Ishai et al. which only allowed the adversary to tamper with 1/|C| fraction of the wires.

Securing Circuits and Protocols against 1/poly(k) Tampering Rate