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Modern vehicles offer a raw territory for designing security solutions as the over-increasing design complexity demanded massive advances in electronics in the absence of a crisp vision over the adversary model. The vehicle Tire Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS) is a sub-system that recently triggered some attention in the light of several reported attacks. In this work we start from analyzing existing proposals and reckon some shortcomings, e.g., academic proposals are not yet tested on real-world components while a patented security solution from the industry (likely deployed in practice) is completely insecure. Motivated by these, we design a new solution and deploy it on real-world components that are used in the automotive industry. Designing security for this subsystem proves to be especially relevant as the computational resources for TPM systems are somewhat at the minimum to be found in automotive embedded devices. Our solution is deployed on Infineon SP37 sensors and takes advantage of some recently proposed light-weight cryptographic designs, e.g., SPECK and PRESENT.

LiMon - Lightweight Authentication for Tire Pressure Monitoring Sensors