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The current work focuses on the issue of receiver access control in the context of the Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM) protocol. Currently, a host within a subnet can request the multicast router to join any multicast group without that host being authenticated and authorized to join. This (unauthorized) join-request results in the multicast distribution tree being extended towards that subnet, which opens the possibility of attacks. In such an attack, the malicious user/host intentionally extends or "pulls" the tree towards its subnet, effecting a wastage in resources and state within all the affected routers. In this case, the end-to-end encryption of the multicast data does not provide any help, since the (encrypted) packets still flows down the distribution tree to the malicious host. The current work analyzes this problem closer in the context of PIM Sparse Mode (PIM-SM) and offers a solution. The proposed approach also complements the recent developments in IGMPv3 [1] and the Express multicast model of [2].

RP-Based Multicast Receiver Access Control in PIM-SM