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In this paper we consider an extension to the classical definition ofcongestion games (CG) in which multiple users share the same set of resourcesand their payoff for using any resource is a function of the total number ofusers sharing it. The classical congestion games enjoy some very appealingproperties, including the existence of a Nash equilibrium and that everyimprovement path is finite and leads to such a NE (also called the finiteimprovement property or FIP), which is also a local optimum to a potentialfunction. On the other hand, this class of games does not model well thecongestion or resource sharing in a wireless context, a prominent feature ofwhich is spatial reuse. What this translates to in the context of a congestiongame is that a users payoff for using a resource (interpreted as a channel) isa function of the its number of its interfering users sharing that channel,rather than the total number among all users. This makes the problem quitedifferent. We will call this the congestion game with resource reuse (CG-RR).In this paper we study intrinsic properties of such a game; in particular, weseek to address under what conditions on the underlying network this gamepossesses the FIP or NE. We also discuss the implications of these results whenapplied to wireless spectrum sharing

Congestion games with resource reuse and applications in spectrum sharing