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Nodes in an ad hoc wireless network incur certain costs for forwardingpackets since packet forwarding consumes the resources of the nodes. If thenodes are rational, free packet forwarding by the nodes cannot be taken forgranted and incentive based protocols are required to stimulate cooperationamong the nodes. Existing incentive based approaches are based on the VCG(Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism which leads to high levels of incentivebudgets and restricted applicability to only certain topologies of networks.Moreover, the existing approaches have only focused on unicast and multicast.Motivated by this, we propose an incentive based broadcast protocol thatsatisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility and minimizes the incentive budgetsrequired by the individual nodes. The proposed protocol, which we call {\emBIC-B} (Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast) protocol, also satisfiesbudget balance. We also derive a necessary and sufficient condition for theex-post individual rationality of the BIC-B protocol. The {\em BIC-B} protocolexhibits superior performance in comparison to a dominant strategy incentivecompatible broadcast protocol.

Design of an Optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol for Ad hoc Networks with Rational Nodes