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The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions is limited to handling thecase of single units of multiple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly onebundle (single minded bidders). This paper extends the current art by proposingan optimal auction for procuring multiple units of multiple items when thebidders are single minded. The auction minimizes the cost of procurement whilesatisfying Bayesian incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality.Under appropriate regularity conditions, this optimal auction also satisfiesdominant strategy incentive compatibility.

An Optimal Multi-Unit Combinatorial Procurement Auction with Single Minded Bidders