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A new approach on cryptanalysis is proposed where the goal is to explore thefundamental limits of a specific class of attacks against a particularcryptosystem. As a first step, the approach is applied on ABSG, which is anLFSR-based stream cipher where irregular decimation techniques are utilized.Consequently, under some mild assumptions, which are common in cryptanalysis,the tight lower bounds on the algorithmic complexity of successful Query-BasedKey-Recovery attacks are derived for two different setups of practicalinterest. The proofs rely on the concept of ``typicality'' of informationtheory.

Towards Exploring Fundamental Limits of System-Specific Cryptanalysis Within Limited Attack Classes: Application to ABSG