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Non-repudiation protocols have an important role in many areas where securedtransactions with proofs of participation are necessary. Formal methods areclever and without error, therefore using them for verifying such protocols iscrucial. In this purpose, we show how to partially represent non-repudiation asa combination of authentications on the Fair Zhou-Gollmann protocol. Afterdiscussing its limits, we define a new method based on the handling of theknowledge of protocol participants. This method is very general and is ofnatural use, as it consists in adding simple annotations, like forauthentication problems. The method is very easy to implement in tools able tohandle participants knowledge. We have implemented it in the AVISPA Tool andanalyzed the optimistic Cederquist-Corin- Dashti protocol, discovering twounknown attacks. This extension of the AVISPA Tool for handling non-repudiationopens a highway to the specification of many other properties, without any morechange in the tool itself.

Automatic Methods for Analyzing Non-Repudiation Protocols with an Active Intruder