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In wireless packet-forwarding networks with selfish nodes, applications of arepeated game can induce the nodes to forward each others' packets, so that thenetwork performance can be improved. However, the nodes on the boundary of suchnetworks cannot benefit from this strategy, as the other nodes do not depend onthem. This problem is sometimes known as the curse of the boundary nodes. Toovercome this problem, an approach based on coalition games is proposed, inwhich the boundary nodes can use cooperative transmission to help the backbonenodes in the middle of the network. In return, the backbone nodes are willingto forward the boundary nodes' packets. The stability of the coalitions isstudied using the concept of a core. Then two types of fairness, namely, themin-max fairness using nucleolus and the average fairness using the Shapleyfunction are investigated. Finally, a protocol is designed using both repeatedgames and coalition games. Simulation results show how boundary nodes andbackbone nodes form coalitions together according to different fairnesscriteria. The proposed protocol can improve the network connectivity by about50%, compared with pure repeated game schemes.

Coalition Games with Cooperative Transmission: A Cure for the Curse of Boundary Nodes in Selfish Packet-Forwarding Wireless Networks