Critical Reflections on Intentions and Linguistic Communication

This paper has the following structure: first, Paul Grice’s original account of non-natural meaning (in “Meaning”) is critically discussed; second, Stephen Neale’s analysis (in “Paul Grice and the Philosophy of Language”) is critically discussed; third, Kent Bach and Robert Harnish’s analysis of linguistic communication is critically discussed; lastly, due to considerations detailed in the previous section, doubts are raised about the viability of intentional based semantics. In discussing Neale and Bach and Harnish, two novel counter-examples are employed to show their analyses to be inadequate. The word ‘mean’ can be used in a variety of ways. Sentences like ‘Those spots mean measles’, ‘Smoke means fire’ and ‘Those red dots mean that the spider is poisonous’ are all well formed and informative. Those uses of ‘mean’ contrast sharply with such sentences as ‘Jack meant for you to get out by saying “Out!”’ and ‘“Jack loves his wife” means that Jack loves his wife’, which are also all well formed and informative. These two uses of ‘mean’ get at a distinction between what Grice calls natural meaning in the former case (hereafter meaningN) and non-natural meaning in the latter case (hereafter meaningNN). 1 Grice extends the use of the word ‘utterance’ to apply to any candidate for meaningNM; hand gestures and similar performances can be candidates for meaningNN and therefore they are utterances. When we ask “What does a speaker means by x?” or state that “Jack means by x that...”, x is an utterance act. A request for the meaning of an utterance act is a request for the “utterer’s occasionmeaning.” A request for the utterer’s occasionmeaning is a request for the value of P in ‘U meant by uttering x that P.’ 1 H.P. Grice, “Meaning” in Studies in The Ways of Words, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 213-215. 2 H.P. Grice, “Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions” in Studies in the Ways of Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 90. Res Cogitans (2016) 7 Haas | 81 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans Grice’s analysis of the meaningNN of utterance acts is as follows. For an utterer U, an utterance act x and an audience A: U meantNN P by uttering x if and only if (iff) U uttered x intending (1) A to produce a belief that P, and (2) A to produce the belief that P by means of A’s recognition of U’s intention for A to produce the belief that P. There has been a proliferation of counterexamples to this account of meaningNN. The two counterexamples that I will mention will both be cases where U meantNN something by uttering x, but the right-side of the biconditional is false, thereby making the analysis incorrect. The first counterexample attacks requirement (1). A family of cases where the left-side of the biconditional is true and requirement (1) is false, following Vlach, are cases of Duty. Suppose for example that a prophet (U) is to be burned at the stake if she refuses to renounce that she is specially connected to God. Let the ‘something’ that U means be the proposition that U is specially connected to God (P). U recognizes that the executioner will never come to believe P, suppose God told her that the executioner would not believe P. U does not care about the executioner’s obstinance and, believing herself to be bound by her duty to God, utters ‘U is specially connected to God’ (x). So, U meansNN P by uttering x and U did not utter x intending the executioner to believe P. This is a counterexample to the proposed account of meaningNN because the left-side of the biconditional is true, U really did mean P by uttering x, but requirement (1) is false. The second counterexample also attacks requirement (1). The second counterexample is an accusing case. Suppose a copper (U) accuses a burglar (A) of burgling. In such a case, U meantNN that A is a burglar (P) by uttering ‘A is a burglar’ (x). U does not utter x intending A to produce the belief that P; U knows that A was at the scene while A was burgling and therefore U knows that A believes that P. Therefore, (1) is false. Neale, in “Paul Grice and the Philosophy of Language,” succeeds in formulating an analysis of speaker meaning that confronts these two counterexamples. Neale recognizes that the two counterexamples are successful due to the overly strong 3 Grice’s analysis, in his own words, is “‘A meantNN something by x’ is (roughly) equivalent to ‘A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention.” Grice, “Meaning,” 220. 4 Frank Vlach, “Speaker’s Meaning,” Linguistics and Philosophy 4 (1981): 367. 5 Stephen Neale, “Paul Grice and the Philosophy of Language,” Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (1992). Res Cogitans (2016) 7 Haas | 82 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans requirement that a speaker must intend her audience to believe what she states. Neale agrees with Searle that “by defining meaning in terms of intended effects, [Grice’s analysis] confuses illocutionary with perlocutionary acts. Put crudely, Grice in effect defines meaning in terms of intending to perform a perlocutionary act [i.e. producing a belief in an audience], but saying something and meaning it is a matter of intending to perform an illocutionary act.” Instead of incorporating the perlocutionary effect of production of a belief into an analysis of meaningNN, Neale incorporates the illocutionary effect of actively entertaining. Neale contends that the second requirement (i.e. the reflexive requirement (2) in Grice’s analysis) is both not necessary and, when paired with the first requirement, not sufficient. I will only focus on Neale’s argument for the second requirement not being necessary. The second requirement is not necessary because it disallows Herod from meaningNN that John the Baptist is dead by showing John the Baptist's head to Salome. Herod (U) meantNN that John the Baptist is dead (P) by revealing John the Baptist’s head and U revealed John the Baptist’s head to Salome (A) intending A to produce a belief that P, but not intending A to produce a belief that P by means of A’s recognition of U’s intention for A to produce a belief that P. This is the case because U believes that A will produce the belief that P upon seeing John’s head, not by recognition of U’s intention. Grice in “Meaning” and Bach and Harnish contrasts with Neale in having the intuition that Herod did not meanNN anything by revealing John the Baptist’s head; so, for those who share Grice’s and Bach and Harnish’s intuition, this is not a counterexample to (2) being necessary. Neale, taking into account all the counterexamples so far mentioned, formulates the following analysis. “By uttering x, U meant that p iff for some audience A, (1) U uttered x intending A actively to entertain the thought that P (or the thought that U believes that P) (2) U uttered x intending A to recognize that U intends A actively to entertain the thought that P. and (3) U does not intend A to be deceived about U’s intentions (1) and (2).” Neale is using ‘actively’ in the same way as Grice in “Utterer’s Meaning and Intention.” To actively have some attitude towards P is to have an attitude towards P 6 John Searle, Speech Acts An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 43-44. 7 I have no clear intuition in the Herod case. Many prominent philosophers side with Neale including Schiffer, Meaning, 56. 8 Neale, “Paul Grice and the Philosophy of Language,” 37. Res Cogitans (2016) 7 Haas | 83 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans that is occurrent and not merely dispositional. Neale does not define what he means by ‘entertain’, but the way that he uses it leads me to believe that to entertain a proposition P is simply to think of P or to consider P. Neale’s requirements (1) and (2) are not a single complex reflexive intention. Neale follows Schiffer in Meaning and Grice in “Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions” and moves to an iterative account. This is not a reflexive account because it does not include a reflexive communicative intention (i.e. an intention to produce an effect on an audience by means of the audience’s recognition of that very intention). Requirement (3) is not an intention of U, but rather a requirement on the kinds of intentions that meaningNN something requires. The following counterexample to Neale’s analysis is a case where the leftside of the biconditional is false but the right-side is true. Suppose A always entertains the proposition that A would be happier if A were married whenever U talks about his wife. Suppose U knows that A knows that U knows this oddity about A (this will be important to avoid falsifying Neale’s third requirement). Suppose also that A become sad when he entertains this proposition. Suppose A makes U angry by eating U’s lunch. U, in retribution, says “My wife is at work” (x). U utters x intending A actively to entertain the thought that U’s wife is at work and A would be happier if A were married. U utters x intending A to recognize that U intends A actively to entertain the thought that U’s wife is at work and A would be happier if A were married (because U is angry at A, U wants A to recognize that U is purposefully causing A sadness). U also does not intend A to be deceived about U’s intentions; this is the case because U knows that A knows that U knows this oddity about A. So, the right-side is true. Is this a case where by uttering ‘My wife is at work’, U meant that U’s wife is at work and A would be happier if A were married? I have the strong intuition that it is not such a case. All that U meant was that U’s wife is at work. So, by uttering x, U did not mean that U’s wife is at work and A would be happier if A were married. Therefore, the left-side of the biconditional is false and the analysis is incorrect. Bach and Harnish recognize that “communicative success does not require that [the audience] responds as you wish, such as to believe you... It is enough for