Command-And-Control or Taxation? The Cases of Water Regulation in California and Denmark | Zendy

Christina Harders | Zendy; Gert Tinggaard Svendsen | Zendy

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Command-And-Control or Taxation? The Cases of Water Regulation in California and Denmark

Author(s) -

Christina Harders,

Gert Tinggaard Svendsen

Publication year - 2015

Publication title -

environmental management and sustainable development

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

ISSN - 2164-7682

DOI - 10.5296/emsd.v4i2.8358

Subject(s) - variation (astronomy) , control (management) , scarcity , order (exchange) , span (engineering) , class (philosophy) , economics , public economics , microeconomics , finance , computer science , engineering , management , artificial intelligence , physics , civil engineering , astrophysics

California and Denmark are both facing water scarcity issues as demand has increased and supply has decreased over the years. In order to solve this problem these two actors have chosen very different ways of dealing with sustaining an adequate amount of domestic water supply. California has chosen an ineffective command-and-control (CAC) tool, whereas Denmark has chosen the effective tool of taxation. One main explanation for this variation in policy choice is the variation in institutional setups, namely the corporatist route in Denmark versus the pluralistic route in California.

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