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CONSCIOUSNESS AND BEHAVIOURISM
Author(s) -
KEEHN J. D.
Publication year - 1964
Publication title -
british journal of psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.536
H-Index - 92
eISSN - 2044-8295
pISSN - 0007-1269
DOI - 10.1111/j.2044-8295.1964.tb00901.x
Subject(s) - consciousness , psychology , argument (complex analysis) , collateral , control (management) , cognitive science , epistemology , cognitive psychology , philosophy , neuroscience , law , biochemistry , chemistry , management , economics , political science
It has been argued, especially recently by Burt, that behaviourism is untenable because the concept of consciousness cannot be denied. This argument is rejected because the functional behaviourism of B. F. Skinner not only does not reject consciousness but includes an account of how behaviour made to private, conscious, experience can be brought under public control. A simple example of how behaviour to private stimuli can be controlled through the use of collateral stimuli is described. Fuller accounts are available in the references given.