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Rule‐Following and Externalism *
Author(s) -
MILLER ALEXANDER
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00329.x
Subject(s) - externalism , skepticism , internalism and externalism , philosophy , epistemology
John McDowell has suggested recently that there is a route from his favoured solution to Kripke's Wittgenstein's “sceptical paradox” about rule‐following to a particular form of cognitive externalism. In this paper, 1 argue that this is not the case: even granting McDowell his solution to the rule‐following paradox, his preferred version of cognitive externalism does not follow.