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Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation
Author(s) -
CARTER RICHARD,
MANASTER STEVEN
Publication year - 1990
Publication title -
the journal of finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 18.151
H-Index - 299
eISSN - 1540-6261
pISSN - 0022-1082
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb02426.x
Subject(s) - initial public offering , underwriting , reputation , business , equity (law) , incentive , venture capital , information asymmetry , public offering , finance , monetary economics , economics , microeconomics , social science , sociology , political science , law
This paper examined the returns earned by subscribing to initial public offerings of equity (IPOs). Rock (1986) suggests that IPO returns are required by uninformed investors as compensation for the risk of trading against superior information. We show that IPOs with more informed investor capital require higher returns. The marketing underwriter's reputation reveals the expected level of “informed” activity. Prestigious underwriters are associated with lower risk offerings. With less risk there is less incentive to acquire information and fewer informed investors. Consequently, prestigious underwriters are associated with IPOs that have lower returns.