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E fficient C ontract D esign for A gri ‐E nvironment P olicy
Author(s) -
Moxey Andrew,
White Ben,
Ozanne Adam
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
journal of agricultural economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.157
H-Index - 61
eISSN - 1477-9552
pISSN - 0021-857X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1477-9552.1999.tb00807.x
Subject(s) - regulator , information asymmetry , business , industrial organization , chemistry , microeconomics , microbiology and biotechnology , economics , biochemistry , biology , gene
This paper evaluates alternative designs for contracts between a regulator and an agricultural producer to increase the supply of environmental public goods. Contract design, based on the principal‐agent model, takes into account an asymmetry of information between the regulator and producer whereby the regulator is unable to observe precisely the producer's compliance costs. An example is included of contracts designed for nitrate abatement.