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The Gorilla in the Closet: Joint and Several Liability and the Cleanup of Toxic Waste Sites
Author(s) -
WILKERSON WILLIAM R.,
CHURCH THOMAS W.
Publication year - 1989
Publication title -
law and policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.534
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1467-9930
pISSN - 0265-8240
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9930.1989.tb00037.x
Subject(s) - superfund , liability , tort , doctrine , joint (building) , settlement (finance) , closet , incentive , joint and several liability , political science , law and economics , law , hazardous waste , business , environmental planning , engineering , sociology , economics , waste management , finance , civil engineering , environmental science , payment , microeconomics
The use of the tort law doctrine joint and several liability (JSL) to Superfund, the federal program to cleanup inactive toxic waste sites, has been controversial since, its inception. Despite this controversy, the underlying assumptions for utilizing JSL have gone largely unexamined. We look at four rationales for applying joint and several liability in this setting: (a) a fairness rationale; (b) a settlement rationale; (c) a deep pockets rationale; and (d) an incentives effects rationale. We find that it is unclear whether JSL has had the desired effect of encouraging swift site clean ups. At a minimum it seems clear that unexpected and undesired consequences accompany its use warranting further research on this important public policy question.