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INTIMIDATION: LINKING NEGOTIATION AND CONFLICT
Author(s) -
Ghosh Sambuddha,
Gratton Gabriele,
Shen Caixia
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
international economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.658
H-Index - 86
eISSN - 1468-2354
pISSN - 0020-6598
DOI - 10.1111/iere.12398
Subject(s) - negotiation , intimidation , shadow (psychology) , conflict resolution research , settlement (finance) , conflict resolution , adversary , social psychology , political science , conflict avoidance , economics , law and economics , microeconomics , business , psychology , computer science , law , computer security , finance , payment , psychotherapist
Abstract A challenger wants a resource initially held by a defender, who can negotiate a settlement by offering to share the resource. If Challenger rejects, conflict ensues. During conflict, each player could be a tough type for whom fighting is costless. Therefore, nonconcession intimidates the opponent into conceding. Unlike in models where negotiations happen in the shadow of exogenously specified conflicts, offers made during negotiations determine how conflict unfolds if negotiations fail. In turn, how conflict is expected to unfold determines the players' negotiating positions. In equilibrium, negotiations always fail with positive probability, even if players face a high cost of conflict. Allowing multiple offers leads to brinkmanship—the only acceptable offer is the one made when conflict is imminent. If negotiations fail, conflict is prolonged and not duration dependent.