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Stable Multilateral Trade Agreements
Author(s) -
MachoStadler Inés,
PérezCastrillo David,
Ponsati Clara
Publication year - 1998
Publication title -
economica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.532
H-Index - 65
eISSN - 1468-0335
pISSN - 0013-0427
DOI - 10.1111/1468-0335.00121
Subject(s) - tariff , homogeneous , negotiation , commodity , core (optical fiber) , international economics , economics , multilateral trade negotiations , welfare , international trade , rules of origin , commercial policy , market economy , political science , computer science , mathematics , telecommunications , combinatorics , law
We analyse multilateral tariff negotiations as a game in coalition form. In a model with three identical countries that produce and trade an homogeneous commodity, and where countries’ aggregated welfare can weight differently their different components, we analyse how changes in the countries’ objective affects the stability of coalitions. In other words, we characterize what tariff‐agreements, if any, are stable (i.e. lie in the core).
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