Droysen and the idea of Verstehen

Abstract The conception of Verstehen (understanding) has frequently been used in attempts to characterize the methodological and philosophical particularity of social science and history as against natural science. It is argued in this paper that these attempts must not primarily be interpreted as postulating differences in the logic of explanation . Rather, the notion of Verstehen has been employed mainly with the intention to emphasize the practical nature of historical (and social‐scientific) knowledge in contrast to the theoretical‐contemplative nature of natural‐scientific knowledge. This argument is put forward in the context of an analysis of J. G. Droysen's writings on the theory of history. Droysen introduced the idea of Verstehen into the methodological discussion, and in its main intent his reasoning can be treated as representative of the central concerns of the advocates of Verstehen . An outline of his philosophy of history is presented as well as an interpretation of his claims (1) that Verstehen is a special method , and (2) that Verstehen must replace explanation . The paper concludes with a critique of the attempt to contrast the (alleged) practical knowledge of history with the (alleged) purely theoretical knowledge of natural science.