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Normative solutions for the successful recovery from large-scale disasters have been presented by various research, but implementation requires a long process, and a mechanism for the process to continue is necessary. We consider the consistency among strategies of stakeholders such as government and NGOs. These players make decisions based on not only direct motives but various complex motives and interaction with other players. This paper considers interactive decision making as a game among stakeholders. As a case study, we analyze housing reconstruction project in Sri Lanka after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. There was relatively abundant financial support, but the recovery process did not work in a desirable direction. Regarding two important decisions defining the result of recovery, stakeholders’ possible decisions are evaluated and, by using game theoretic approach, the reason of poor output and the conditions to shift the equilibrium to the one suitable for the long-term goal of recovery are discussed. These analyses showed that motive compatibility among stakeholders should be considered when designing a recovery process for severe disasters.

Motive and Conflict in the Disaster Recovery Process of Housing Reconstruction in Sri Lanka after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami