English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Una de las críticas frecuentes a la justicia como equidad de Rawls es que ésta resulta insuficientemente democrática, puesto que subordina las libertades políticas a un conjunto de derechos y libertades civiles que sirven de restricciones laterales al proceso mayoritario. Sin embargo, en sus últimos trabajos, Rawls insistió en que las libertades políticas tienen idéntico peso que las civiles y que, además, las primeras gozan de un privilegio del que carecen las segundas: estar protegidas por una cláusula que garantiza su valor equitativo. La incorporación de la cláusula del valor equitativo de las libertades políticas en su primer principio de justicia permitiría a Rawls responder a una segunda crítica, la que acusa al liberalismo de defender un esquema de libertades meramente formales. E incidentalmente, a una tercera, aquella que afirma que el principio de diferencia no sólo permite grandes desigualdades económicas sino que incluso las incentiva. En este artículo pretendo mostrar que la cláusula del valor equitativo permite a Rawls (1) escapar las dos primeras críticas, (2) amortiguar la tercera y (3) ofrecer un criterio de distribución de la riqueza alternativo al principio de diferencia (i) léxicamente superior a éste, (ii) más igualitaritarista y (iii) más prometedor en términos de alcanzar un equilibrio reflexivo. Para ello, defino el papel de las libertades políticas en la justicia como equidad y reconstruyo la definición, justificación e implicaciones de la cláusula que protege su valor equitativo.It has been frequently argued that Rawls’s Justice as Fairness denigrates democratic decision-making, as it subordinates political liberties to a set of civil rights and liberties that limit the majority rule. However, at least in his latest works, Rawls claimed that political liberties have the same weight as the civil ones. Even more, he claimed that the former are further protected by a especial proviso —explicitly included in his first principle of justice— that guarantees their fair value. If correct, this proviso would serve as a response to two further criticisms. First, the one that attributes to liberalism the defence of a merely formal set of political liberties and, second, to the argument that attacks Rawls’s Difference Principle not only for allowing large inequalities but also for swelling them. Little work has been done to study the nature, justification and implications of this proviso. And, when done, it has been said to be not satisfactorily founded. In this paper I shall reconstruct the lost arguments for the proviso and argue that its implications are quite revolutionary for Rawls’s theory of justice. First, because it provides an alternative, lexically prior and more demanding distributive principle to that of the difference principle. Second, because it prevents some of the normative problems attributed to the difference principle. And third, because it enables a path to reach a wider reflective equilibrium

Rawls and the Fair Value of Political Liberties Clause