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Many parents of small children understand that, at bedtime, it is unwise to ask, “Do you want to brush your teeth?” The common refrain is, “No!” It is better to ask, “Which do you want to do first: brush your teeth or put on your pajamas?” This is because questions determine a set of possible answers. The first question provides the pair {yes, no}, whereas the second question provides the pair {brush teeth, put on pajamas}. The child may fail to process reasons not to engage in either suggested bedtime activity if the latter question is seriously taken on board. Instead, the child is more likely to only consider reasons that support one of the suggested options. Of course, the second question could be answered obliquely: “Neither. I want to keep playing.” That sort of response is surely familiar to parents. Note, however, that producing it requires the child to recognize that a given decision question does not exhaustively capture a given choice scenario (“making a fuss” is always an additional available choice). In other words, it requires a certain kind of inquisitiveness (wondering what other known possible actions are implicated) and a certain kind of creativity (recalling such possibilities). Fatigue probably inhibits both, which may be why parents find that the question-ploy sometimes works. This way of modeling how people decide, centered on questions of what to do and on practical reasons used to answer those questions, differs from a traditional model in the social sciences, according to which all outcomes are assigned a value in some common currency, for example, utility, attractiveness, or repulsiveness, and the agent then enacts whatever action is expected to result in the outcome with the highest value. Such a “numerical optimization” model of practical decision-making can be normative or descriptive, both in non-moral and moral domains (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1947, Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Greene 2013). Either way, according to numerical models, practical decision-making is a matter of maximizing some variable, not of deliberating about practical reasons.

Reasons-based moral judgment and the erotetic theory