English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

I take for granted as a starting-point the anthropological antinomy on the individual/social nature of man. This antinomy is constituted politically in Hobbes’ thought as the antinomy individual/society, whose legal expression gives rise to the antinomy right/law —in his iusnaturalist conception— which reflects as well the anthropological antinomy passion/reason. This dialectical conception is only implicit in his political and legal philosophy; however, it becomes obvious if the underlying anthropology is analysed. Therefore, the problems derived from this dialectics require a dialectical solution in accordance with the dialecticity of its anthropological foundation. That is why Hobbes’ legal and political philosophy was not and is not still adequate or effective, but in a partial or negative way.

De la locura y la inseguridad del derecho a la racionalidad y el orden de la ley. Lectura dialéctica de Thomas Hobbes