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I do not think of myself as someone who studies cognition but rather metacognition.1 I mention this because I suspect that I’m not alone in feeling more drawn to the latter than the former of these concepts, and it may be worth exploring why. For starters, cognition can be a mystifying term. At times the word just seems to mean thinking; at other times it entails emotions, non-emotional affect, and even assimilated social influences. So this word that denotes the thinking of a single person can also paradoxically connote the opposite of thinking and involvement of other people. But metacognition doesn’t appear more inviting to comprehension. After all, this word encompasses its already confusing root term and further complicates it with a prefix meaning among, with, after, or beyond. This turns out to be a troublesome set of prepositions. On the one hand, when we become aware of our thoughts, our perception might be said to be among or with those thoughts (i.e., together with them); this makes it difficult to distinguish cognition from metacognition. In such a state of mutual company, cognition appears to be knowable. Ann Berthoff (1984) seems to assume as much in her refrain “thinking about thinking” (p. 743), which was my first point of entry into metacognition per se. On the other hand, becoming aware of our thoughts indicates our perception’s state of being beyond or after those thoughts (i.e., separate from them); this makes it difficult not to distinguish cognition from metacognition. As Howard Tinberg (2016) recently put it, “Metacognition is not cognition. Performance, however thoughtful, is not the same as awareness of how that performance came to be” (p. 75). When Linda Flower and John R. Hayes (1981) introduced their cognitive process theory, it

Chapter 14. Researching Habits-of-Mind Self-Efficacy in First-Year College Writers