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We describe here the design, evolution and experimental implementation of a real life, game theory based system for supporting farmers suffering heavy crop damage by wild herbivores near protected areas. The system is community operated in which farmers self-report their produce, which is endorsed by neighbouring farmers. The average deficit in the productivity is compensated by an automated "support cum reward (SuR)" computation, which is directly proportional to the average productivity deficit of the group but also directly proportional to the individual farmer's produce. As a result, farmers are assured a 'support' against the average damage but at the same time a 'reward' for individual's productivity. The design of the game is such that only honest reporting gives maximum returns. An under-reporting farmer receives reduced benefit since the SuR amount is directly proportionate to his self-reported produce. If a farmer over-reports, other farmers of the community suffer a loss since the average deficit reduces. Therefore the endorsing farmers, for their own selfish interest, prevent over-reporting. The system involves multiple game situations, the combined result of which is expected to be a stable honest and hard worker strategy. A trial implementation with a group of 71 farmers over 6 cropping seasons showed that, after a few initial attempts to cheat, honesty prevailed in the entire group; the average crop productivity increased up to 2.5 fold, in spite of the risk of damage, owing to spontaneous increase in inputs by farmers. Apart from wildlife conflict resolution the model offers a promising alternative to crop insurance and a potential behavioural green revolution.

agrirxiv

Where honesty and hard work is the only stable strategy: design, evolution and pilot implementation of a support cum reward game in developmental economics.