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During modern time there was a predominant idea that we could explain the execution of our mental acts without admitting the existence of a subject who would carry out such activity. This idea mentioned, reverberated in an important way the acceptance of the proposal that in the Treatise of Human Nature David Hume made surrounding ‘I’; that this only consisted in being a ‘bundle’ of perceptions. Nevertheless this conception wasn’t new. Now in the Philosophical Commentaries of George Berkeley we can find vestiges of similar notion. This conception as we observe would leave out any representation of the mind as an independent entity of our perceptions that would execute its own activities of a mental life. Finally, the axis of this brief investigation would surround the contour that there wouldn’t be an individual spiritual substance different from the conjunction of (bundle/congeries) of perceptions.

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La noción de “cúmulo (congeries) de percepciones” en los Comentarios filosóficos de George Berkeley [The notion of ‘congeries (cúmulo) de percepciones’ in the Philosophical Commentaries of George Berkeley]