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Over the last two decades several influential studies have appeared that document the rise of conservatism.1 A common theme in many of these books is the diverse constituencies that aided in the conservative ascendancy did not receive equal attention from conservative politicians. This argument is predominant when historians look at the influence of evangelical Christians and supporters of a free-market economy on conservatism. Republicans spoke out in favor of outlawing abortion and about the need to protect the sanctity of marriage and the family—issues of utmost importance to evangelical Christians—but legislative accomplishments rarely matched this rhetoric. Instead, politicians like Ronald Reagan focused on tax cuts and deregulation. In All in the Family, Robert O. Self offers an alternative view of the decline of liberalism and the rise of conservatism by looking at how matters pertaining to the American family since the 1960s allowed conservative politicians to rise to power. Self organizes his book under two similar, yet distinct, conceptions of the nuclear family from 1964 until 2004. Using ‘the family’ is, of course, not something new when it comes to studying the rise of conservatism.2 However, in contrast to these other studies, Self ’s exhaustive account delves into how the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s weakened the liberal conception of family, thereby making room for the new view of the family put forth by conservatives. Whereas the social programs instituted by the New Frontier and the Great Society sought to remove some of the roadblocks to forming a nuclear family and acquiring all of its trappings, conservatives in the 1970s and beyond wanted to protect the nuclear family from immoral and totalitarian forces. Self labels the former efforts “breadwinner liberalism” and the latter attempts “breadwinner conservatism.”3 While examining the conflicting views of the nuclear family offered by liberals and conservatives, Self also uses this framework to show that the split between so-called “values” voters and advocates of the free-market did not actually exist. Self questions the veracity of separating the goals and aspirations of participants of the culture war—which involved issues of gender, sexuality, and family—from the economic programs favored by

Family, War, and Democracy: The Fortunes of Liberalism and Conservatism in Post-1960s America.