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Online grocer Webvan Group, Inc., fired a salvo across the shopping carts of the brick-and-mortar supermarket industry when it announced that within two years it would be delivering Web ordered groceries free-of-charge in 26 major markets throughout the United States (Dembeck, 1999). ~July 14,1999 Webvan Joins List of Dot.Com Failures: Online Grocer Burned Up $830 Million Since 1999 (Mangalindan, 2001). ~July 10, 2001 THE CHANGING FACE OF THE GROCERY INDUSTRY The grocery concept has evolved over many years to drive cost out of the process. Consider how the frontier store, where the customer gave the storeowner a shopping list and he personally picked out the groceries from his shelves, gave way to the invention of the shopping cart in 1936 (Wilson 1978) and the concept of allowing multiple customers to roam the store to pick out their own groceries. Not only did it lower cost but it allowed the grocery to handle more customers at the same time. The concept has been incorporated in virtually all the current models of grocery retailing from the convenience store to traditional grocery store to warehouse club. All have the common element of customer pick. Today, Walmart, with 2,941 stores, owns 1.6 million shopping carts where up to 550 carts are used at any given time (Cahill, 1999). According to industry statistics, the average supermarket's labor expense is currently about 12 percent of sales. Of the labor expense, it is estimated that grocery stocking expense is about 10 percent of its labor expense, or 1.2 percent of sales (Anonymous, 1999). Grocery margins are very thin, typically ranging from 1% to 1 1/2%. The grocery business continues to look for innovative ways to take cost out of the process. For example, in the distribution process of the typical traditional supermarket, a can of tuna changes hands on average 14 times between the food-packing factory and the customer's can opener. Software, networks and warehouse automation can reduce the tuna can's turnover to 11 pairs of hands or fewer. This leads to lower costs, and, if not completely passed on to the consumer, to higher margins (Anonymous, 2000). Ordering groceries on the Internet was initially thought to be a very promising new method to lower cost. People generally want convenience, time- and labor-saving approaches, especially in two-worker households where there's little time for. leisurely shopping. So if price, ordering, quality, freshness and delivery are the same with an Internet grocer, why not--some would say--bypass the traditional grocery store and the need to traverse long aisles, line up at the checkout, and all that hassle (Sleeper, 1999)? Dot.com grocers were formed anticipating that information flow would be a means of driving cost out of the process and increasing margins. Table 1 shows a comparison of the typical supermarket and an on-line grocery delivery model utilized by Streamline to sup-port that claim. A 1998 study by Andersen Consulting predicted that the number of households buying groceries on-line would reach 15 million by 2007 (Santosus 1998). Forrester Research estimated that on-line grocery shopping in the United States would grow from $509 million in 1999 to $10.3 billion in 2004. Progressive Grocer (2001) estimates the overall grocery industry in the U.S. to be $494 billion, suggesting the on-line grocery share would grow from 0.1% to 2.1%. So what happened to on-line grocers? The most telling quote came from a Morningstar newsletter, Peapod ... reminds me of the guy who wants to increase his income, and takes out an ad offering $1.20 in return for every $1 bill he receives. To be sure, hell get a lot of $1 bills--his revenues, so to speak. The drawback is that he loses $0.20 on each one (Kelly, 1999). As of this writing the financial markets for online grocers have been devastated. Publicly traded on-line grocers have closed their doors. …

Where have all the on-line grocers gone? Lessons learned from the demise of on-line grocers